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Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge Presiding.
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Deputy Attorney General
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ARGUMENT

not
Parenting

the rights granted him under the Montana
she was not

she

the Parenting Plan as written.

her non-compliance was excusable under the specific

circumstances
Michelle's

compliance

case at

time of the non-compliance.

were not Kidnapping as defined by Idaho Code § 18-

4501(2). The statute is

as applied in this case. In this case, a reasonable

person could conclude that

was not a "custodial parenC for purposes of Idaho's

Kidnapping

Parenting

did not

to him as a "custodial parent,"

and he never had "physical custody" of P .A.
In construing Section 18-4501
strict construction

this Court should apply the principles of

lenity. Additionally, any interpretation of Section 18-4501 (2)

should take into account the language of Section 18-4506.

Idaho Code § 18-4501(2) is ambiguous because the term "custodial parent"
has numerous reasonable interpretations.

Each of the fifty states will has different understandings of what it means for a
parent to have "custody. '" In its Response, the State has cited Idaho Code § 39-8202 as
one definition of "custodial parent.'" According to that particular statute, a "custodial
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parent" is "the parent with whom the child resides.,,1 Other statutes have different
definitions depending on the context.
If this Court were to accept
"custodial parent."

Code § 39-8202 as the definition

was not a "custodial parent." Section 39-8202 states
parent with whom the child resides" (as opposed to "a

that a "custodial parenC is

parent with \vhom the child resides"). Under this definition, a child "resides" with the
parent with whom

IS

living at the time. Obviously, if the parents

are living in different places, the chiid can only "reside" with one parent at a time.
Additionally, the "custodial parent" is the parent with whom the child is currently
residing, not the parent
definition, in order
parent (to the exclusion
Ricky at the time of
Under the facts

whom the child is scheduled to reside. Under this
to be the "custodial parent," he must be lhe custodial
Michelle), and P.A. must have been physically living with
alleged kidnapping.
this particular case, "custodial parent" is undoubtedly

ambiguous. The Plan was written in Montana and was written subject to that state's
family-law construct. The Montana Parenting Plan never refers to Ricky as a having
any kind of "custody." He was not granted "joint custody," "physical custody," or
"legal custody." Ricky is granted certain parenting rights and is given "parenting
time." The name "Ricky" and the term "custody" never appear together in the entire
document. Based on the plain language of the Parenting Plan, it is perfectly reasonable
for a person to conclude that Ricky was not a "custodial parent."

1

Respondent's Brief. p.6 (emphasis added).
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Ricky did not have physical custody of P
kidnapping.

at the time of the alleged

the time that P.A. was allegedly kidnapped, he resided exclusively
to deliver

to

Ricky's physical custody: Michelle

custody over P .A. for the entire time
IS

a case

. was

there was never any doubt that

having legal
case, Ricky's parenting time never started. From the

Under

Montana courL Ricky was never granted his

date the Parenting

several

parenting time.
The parties were supposed to
showed

exchange
appointed

miles from

and Michelle.

drive several hours and meet at a gas station to
at a gas station at the time he understood to be the

Michelle never arrived.
IS

no

that Michelle did not comply with the parenting plan.

She violated the Parenting Plan and she denied Ricky his rights as stated under the
Michelle's actions may have exposed her to civil liability and contempt
proceedings. Additionally, it may be argued that Michelle ma;' have violated Idaho's
to deliver P .A. to Ricky for

Custodial Interference Statute. However, her

Ricky's parenting time was not kidnapping. In this case, Ricky was scheduled to
receive P .A., but Ricky never had "custody" over P .A.
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This Court's decision could be narrowly crafted to the peculiar facts of this
case. Under the peculiar facts
that

to

case, the Court is faced with a Parenting Plan
to

father. Ricky was granted "parenting

not

is a case where

was alleged

from

parent

kidnapped never received the child in

his physical care.

the statutory construction

2.

construed. or narrowly construed. The
"custodial" when it amended

Legislature
Section 1

to

one must lead, take. entice away, or detain a

child from

parent.

State seeks to include Ricky in this definition.

As stated
and

was not given any
did not

"custody" under the Parenting Plan,
possession at the time of the alleged

kidnapping. To include Ricky as a "custodial parent" is not a strict construction of
Section 18-4501(2).
"Ambiguities in Section j 8-4501 (1) should be resolved in favor of Michelle, the
defendant. The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, "well-settled principles of statutory
construction require that, when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be strictly
construed in favor of the defendant. This principle extends to the elements of the
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substantive crime. An:v ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." State r Roll,
1 8 Idaho 936,

1P

App., 1990),

287. 1290

s
Sections 1
together.

.).

501(2)

Interference Statute and the
term "custodial parent."
defined in pari

Court has

as

The
statutes
. materia are to be construed together means
that each legislative act IS to be interpreted with other acts relating to
eel. Statutes are
pari materia when they relate
the same matter or
to
same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as
one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be
a code
statutes relating to one subject was governed by
inferred
policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious
one spmt
in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of Jearning the
intention.
statutes relating to
same subject are to be compared,
and so far as still
force brought into harmony by interpretation.

State r. Barnes,

P.2d 290, 294 (1

(quoting Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho

State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho L 4, 855 P.2d

465 (1993»).

In Barnes, this Coun addressed the issue of when two separate statutes dealt
with the operation of snow mobiles while under the influence. This Court found that
the less severe statute dealt \vith driving snowmobiles generally, while the more
severe STatute dealt with driving a snowmobile while intoxicated on a public street.
Accordingly, the two statutes could be distinguished based on location of the alleged
violation.
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The State cites the Idaho Court of Appeals' case Stare v. Folsom, 139 Idaho
627, 84 P .3d 563 (Idaho App. 2003). In Folsom, the legal issue before the Court
Appeals was how to construe two statutes touching on the subjecTs of neglect and
abandolLment of a vulnerable

The Court perceived

issue as follows:

\Vhile both
. §§ 18-1505 and 18-1505A criminalize the failure to
provide care to a vulnerable adult there is a significant difference
between mere neglect and felonious abandonment. Pursuant to the clear
§1
505A. we conclude that the crime of
language of
abandonment is committed when a caretaker affects a complete
withdrawal
care.
length of time that care is withheld is a factor
for the jury to consider in deciding \vhether an accused has abandoned,
or merely neglected, the vulnerable adult. In addition, abandonment is
distinguished
mere neglect in that abandonment requires
"deliberate disregard"
the safety or welfare of the vulnerable adult.

State

1'.

Fa/sam,

at 566-67. The Court reasoned that the distinction between

the statutes was a distinction in severity: abandonment was more severe than neglect,
and the jury would

left to decide whether the defendant had neglected or abandoned

the victim.
Neither Barnes nor Folsom applies

this case. Barnes dealt with two statutes

that applied in different locales. Folsom dealt with two statutes that applied under
different severities. In this case, the Coun is asked to compare Idaho's Custodial
Interference Statute and Idaho's Kidnapping Statute, and interpret the Idaho
Legislature's intent based on what the Kidnapping Statute omits.
Section 18 -4501 (2) contains two imponant omissi ons-( 1) there are terms
included

Custodial Interference not included under the Kidnapping Statute, and

there are defenses included under the Custodial Interference Statute not included
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under the Kidnapping Statute. "Where a statute with respect to one subject contains a
such provision from a similar statute concerning a

certain provision, the omission

related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed. ,. Kopp v. SWle,
Idaho 1

3

5

the Custodial

314 (1
Statute covers a much broader array of
a merely custodial parent, but any

includes "a parent

parental

custody, visitation or

parent] or
other

such rights

from temporary or permanent custody
parent

order" 1.

the absence of a custody

§ 18-4506.

Statute at issue, § 1
the "custodial
specificity

the

applies to protect the interests

guardian, or other person having lawful care or control.'· The
UJ1,"U,HH

Second.
granted
that there are justifications

Interference statute is entirely omitted.
Statute omits the defenses
Interference

Idaho Legislature

The Idaho Legislature recognized

a parent to refuse to deliver a child to the other parent.

The Legislature expressed those justifications as defenses.
The Kidnapping Statute contains no such defenses. The Idaho Legislature
intended that there be no justification for Kidnapping. In

case, the reason Michelle

failed to deliver P.A. over to Ricky was because of her concern for her son' s physical
safety. The Idaho Legislature intended that individuals like Michelle, a mother who
refuses to hand over her child out of concern for his safety, to be able to present her
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verSIOn

the facts. Charging Michelle

Kidnapping eviscerates that intent, and

prevents Michelle from presenting her rationale to the jury.

Michelle

not kidnap her son under Section 18-4501

parenting plan, and

have interfered

not kidnap
ambiguous

She violated a

Ricky's parental rights, but she did

statute that Michelle is accused of committing is
, and it is certainly ambiguous

how it would specifically apply

to Michelle's case.
For the reasons

above, Section 18-4501 (2) should be narrowly construed

to exclude those

the aggrieved parent is neither given "custody" in

the parenting

not have physi cal custody of the child at the time of the

alleged kidnapping, and

all eged kidnapper is the child's mother with both legal

and physical custody.

DATED this

day

January. 2012.

PENDLEBURY
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